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Complete Abstract:
In two recent papers, I have proposed a description of decision analysis that differs from the Bayesian
picture painted by Savage, Jeffrey and other classic authors. Response to this view have been either
overly enthusiastic or unduly pessimistic. In this paper I try to place the idea in its proper place, which
must be somewhere in between. Looking at decision analysis as defeasible reasoning produces a
framework in which planning and decision theory can be integrated, but work on the details has barely
begun. It also produces a framework in which the meta-decision regress can be stopped in a reasonable
way, but it does not allow us to ignore meta-level decisions. The heuristics for producing arguments that I
have presented are only supposed to be suggestive; but they are not open to the egregious errors about
which some have worried. And though the idea is familiar to those who have studied heuristic search, it is
somewhat richer because the control of dialectic is more interesting than the deepening of the search.

